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Abstract Evaluation studies of the Bayh-Dole Act are generally concerned with
the pace of innovation or the transgressions to the independence of research. While
these concerns are important, I propose here to expand the range of public values
considered in assessing Bayh-Dole and formulating future reforms. To this end, I
ﬁrst examine the changes in the terms of the Bayh-Dole debate and the drift in its
design. Neoliberal ideas have had a deﬁnitive inﬂuence on U.S. innovation policy
for the last thirty years, including legislation to strengthen patent protection.
Moreover, the neoliberal policy agenda is articulated and justiﬁed in the interest of
‘‘competitiveness.’’ Rhetorically, this agenda equates competitiveness with eco-
nomic growth and this with the public interest. Against that backdrop, I use Public
Value Failure criteria to show that values such as political equality, transparency,
and fairness in the distribution of the beneﬁts of innovation, are worth considering
to counter the ‘‘policy drift’’ of Bayh-Dole.
Keywords Bayh-Dole  Evaluation  Public values  Pace of innovation 
Political equality
Introduction
In the last three years, Congress has intensiﬁed scrutiny of the Bayh-Dole Act (P.L.
96-517)—holding hearings to assess the ﬁrst 25 years of this policy (U.S. House of
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1 (U.S. Senate, October 24,
2007), and more recently, to consider the possibilities for improving the technology
transfer regime (U.S. House of Rep., June 10, 2010). In the most recent hearing,
Rep. Daniel Lipinski (Dem.-IL), chair of the Technology and Innovation
Subcommittee, announced that the intention of the subcommittee is ‘‘to carry out
a comprehensive review of the Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovation Acts later this year.’’ Anticipating that Congress may eventually muster
the political will to amend Bayh-Dole, the National Research Council (NRC)
commissioned a consensus report on university management of intellectual property
that was recently published (NRC 2010). Because that report synthesizes the
voluminous literature that assesses Bayh-Dole, this paper could be read as a
companion study that points out lacunae in the literature.
The vast majority of evaluation studies of the Bayh-Dole Act (the ‘‘Act’’) are
either concerned with its effects on the pace of innovation or concerned with the
culture and organization of academic research. Studies of the ﬁrst type examine, for
example, the possible loss of quality in university research (e.g. Henderson, Jaffe,
and Trajtenberg 1998; Jensen and Thursby 2001; Mowery et al. 2004; Mowery and
Ziedonis 2002; Rafferty 2008; Sampat, Mowery and Ziedonis 2003), the threats to
basic research from the ‘‘enclosure’’ of the scientiﬁc commons (Heller 1998; Heller
and Eisenberg 1998; Shapiro 2000; cf. Walsh, Arora, and Cohen 2003), and the
friction brought about by aggressive bargainers of intellectual property (Jaffe and
Lerner 2004; Thursby and Thursby 2006). These are presented as problems because
they risk slowing down innovation. Studies of the second type believe in an ideal set
of norms for academic research, an ‘‘academic ethos’’ that encompasses norms such
as the public dissemination of research, impartiality in peer-review, and faculty
discretion over the curricula and the research agenda. These authors argue that since
Bayh-Dole was enacted, the transgressions to these norms have become more
frequent and pervasive (Greenberg 2007; Judson 2004; Slaughter and Leslie 1997;
Slaughter and Rhoades 2004; Washburn 2005). While both concerns must to be
taken into consideration to understand the Bayh-Dole regime, I argue in this paper
that limiting our attention to them narrows the scope of analysis and misses other
important values. For instance, ‘‘distributive equity’’ or ‘‘political equality’’ are
much more adequate values for evaluating outcomes such as affordability of new
medical treatments or processes such as bureaucratic regulation of patent-based
monopolistic practices.
To redress this narrowness in conventional evaluations of Bayh-Dole, I take a
different approach to evaluation. This approach, called Public Value Mapping
(Bozeman 2002, 2007), allows me to explicitly consider public values other than the
pace of innovation or transgressions to the academic ethos. In order to expand the
scope of values considered, it is necessary to understand the public values that
currently dominate the institutions and discourses of the Bayh-Dole regime. It is
necessary as well to examine how the balance between those dominant values
1 This provision requires government-owned-contractor-operated facilities to pay the government a 75%
of any portion of net operating licensing income (i.e. net of related expenses) that exceeds 5% of the
facility’s operating budget (35 U.S.C. §202-C-7-E-i).
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implemented. The examination of this dual drift problem—the simultaneous ‘‘drift’’
in the policy design and the policy debate—is integral to my analysis.
Before discussing the dual drift problem, I want to brieﬂy describe what the
Public Value Mapping (PVM) approach is and why it is suitable for the evaluation
of Bayh-Dole. Considering that public values are latent in all facets of policy, from
the formation of expectations to the evaluation of outcomes, PVM is an approach to
examine policy through the lenses of the intervening public values. PVM redirects
attention in policy analysis from cause-and-effect relations to the articulation-and-
realization of public values in the making of policy. Why PVM is useful to examine
Bayh-Dole? The answer follows from two premises. First, the predominant criteria
of policy evaluation, the Market Failure Criteria (MFC), are also common rationales
for policy: government is justiﬁed to intervene in the economy only to correct noise
in the price mechanism. Second, Bayh-Dole is a canonical policy solution to a
market failure problem. The alleged problem is that ﬁrms are reluctant to invest in
product-development if they cannot appropriate the potential returns of their
investment, in this case, by keeping exclusive rights to the patents of those products.
The Bayh-Dole solution consists in creating a market for those patents: government
transfers its patent rights to universities, and universities can lease those patents to
ﬁrms. It follows from these premises that, evaluation studies that use the Market
Failure Criteria will conclude that the Act has been an unqualiﬁed success because it
did in fact create a market for public patents. If evaluators disagree, it will be only
about the degree of success—as measured by the effectiveness of the appropriation
mechanism, or how much development and commercialization were really
streamlined, or whether the incentives introduced have perverse effects. However,
market failure studies cannot assess the other half of Bayh-Dole on its own merits
because they must apply the same evaluation standard to all provisions; under that
light, the provisions to keep a check on the proﬁt motive are bound to be considered
unnecessary. PVM in turn is normatively more ﬂexible than market failure. It starts
by identifying the public values that motivated those provisions and then examines
whether those values were realized in the evolution and implementation of Bayh-
Dole. The normative criteria of PVM are concerned with the realization of core
public values in the policy-making process without necessarily privileging the
operation of the markets. In Section Public Value Failure in the Bayh-Dole Regime,
I probe Bayh-Dole with the Public Value Failure Criteria.
At this point I should make a conceptual digression to explain my use of ‘‘policy
design.’’ I use this term in the sense of Schneider and Ingram (1997) to refer to the
‘‘substance of public policy’’; that is, the ‘‘blueprints, architecture, discourses, and
aesthetics of policy’’ (p. 2). The use of policy design underlines my stance in policy
analysis that conceives of policy as a ﬂuid institution rather than a crystallized rule,
and deals with policy-making as an ongoing political negotiation rather than a
multi-stage linear process that commences in formulation and ends in implemen-
tation. As Schneider and Ingram (1997) point out, the letter of the law is ﬁxed but
only until the law is amended or modiﬁed by other statutes, and more pervasively,
the letter of the law is always subject to different interpretations and those
interpretations are subject to contestation.
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the Bayh-Dole debate and the policy design can be traced to the ascendancy of
neoliberalism over U.S. policy-making and to the reforms to the patent system
(including the amendments to the Bayh-Dole statute). I treat these factors as two
analytical threads recognizing that they are entwined and interdependent.
The inﬂuence of neoliberal ideas over social and economic policy, over the last
three decades and on both sides of the Atlantic, cannot be underestimated.
Neoliberalism is hard to catalogue; it has been variously deﬁned as a doctrine of
political economy (Harvey 2007), an ideology (Turner 2008), and a ‘‘thought
collective’’ (Mirowski 2009). For all its internal plurality, its adherents share a
fundamental commitment to private property, free markets, and a strong state to
enforce the law. The neoliberal defense of free markets acquires a political
dimension when it equates freedom with free markets, adding a moral imperative to
the classical justiﬁcation of markets as the most efﬁcient mechanism for the
allocation of resources. Furthermore, the neoliberal state ought to be small but
strong enough to effectively enforce the law, property rights, and secure the
untroubled operation of markets. The dual prescription of unfettered markets and an
assertive state have pervaded all policy domains, and in the case at hand, their
decisive inﬂuence on the Bayh-Dole regime has been amply noted (Mirowski and
Sent 2007; Nedeva and Boden 2006; Pestre 2005; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). In
Section The Changing Terms of the Bayh-Dole Debate, I bring these arguments to
bear and discuss the centrality of ‘‘competitiveness,’’ as a key public value and a
rhetoric trope, to the terms of the Bayh-Dole debate.
The second factor driving the policy drift in Bayh-Dole can be decomposed into
two components, ‘‘bureaucratic drift’’ (McCubbins et al. 1987) and ‘‘legislative
drift’’ (Horn and Shepsle 1989). Bureaucratic drift—that is, changes to the policy
by administrative discretion—resulted from the failure of the enacting coalition to
establish administrative procedures that would effectively constrain the proﬁt
motive, particularly with respect to exclusive licenses and the emergence of
‘‘creative’’ licensing practices (e.g. reach-through clauses). Legislative drift—that
is, subsequent statutory amendments to the law that alter its mechanisms and
aims—was the consequence of not providing for institutional mechanisms to
replicate the political pressures of the enacting coalition, particularly with respect
to limited beneﬁts for large ﬁrms and sufﬁcient authority for federal agencies to
safeguard the public interest. To understand why the enacting coalition arrived at a
compromise with respect to checks on the proﬁt motive, limitations on large ﬁrms,
and administrative regulatory discretion, I review in Section Changes in the Design
of Bayh-Dole the terms of the compromise achieved by the enacting coalition and
account for the drift in terms of amendments to Bayh-Dole, and other changes in
the patent law and the patent system, including the creation of the Court of
Appeals of the Federal Circuit and key Supreme Court rulings on patentable
subject matter.
The next two sections will engage respectively with the drift in the debate and the
drift in the design setting the stage for the analysis of public value failure in the
subsequent section. The last section draws some conclusions from this analysis.
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The impetus for legislative reform does not come as a surprise when one considers
that the Bayh-Dole debate has carried on for three decades and that critics of the Act
have redoubled efforts to reform it, lately opening a new front of attack. Whereas
past critics of the Act worried that the incentives to accelerate the commercial-
ization of public research had a perverse effect on the performance of research itself
(Heller and Eisenberg 1998; Heller 1998; Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 1998;
Merges and Nelson 1990; Mowery et al. 2004; Shapiro 2000), a new generation of
critics now worries that Bayh-Dole does not facilitate research commercialization
sufﬁciently well (Litan, Mitchell, and Reedy 2007; Kenney and Patton 2009). This
latter group, led by researchers of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation—a
steward of entrepreneurship—proposed to amend Bayh-Dole so that inventors retain
title to their inventions and be given full discretion over those titles, instead of
assigning those rights to their employers, the universities. They claim that the
university is a bottleneck in the commercialization of research and that in order to
avert a slowing down of innovation, scientists should be free to choose a partner to
negotiate the development of their research (Litan, Mitchell, and Reedy 2007). In
response, former senator Birch Bayh—one of the Act’s sponsors and its staunchest
defender—rebuked the Kauffman Foundation proposal, arguing that the university
was an essential partner in the commercialization of public-funded research, and
stressed that it was widely believed that Bayh-Dole promoted research commer-
cialization and injected dynamism in the U.S. innovation system (Bayh, Allen, and
Bremer 2009). Still, the Kauffman Foundation proposal was welcomed in the
business community and endorsed by the inﬂuential Harvard Business Review
(2010), and what is more, Lesa Mitchell, one of its authors and a vice-president at
that foundation, was invited as a witness to the most recent Congressional hearing
on Bayh-Dole.
If we remember that the 96th Congress would not have even considered Bayh-
Dole in 1980 had the proposed bill not included the university in the equation (see
Stevens 2004; Washburn 2005, pp. 63–69), we cannot help to wonder: How did we
get here? How can a proposal to exclude the university from technology transfer be
given serious consideration? The answer lies in the changing terms of the Bayh-
Dole debate, particularly the importance that government ofﬁcials ascribe to patent
protection and an increasingly liberal attitude of university administrators towards
patenting and licensing. Regarding patent protection, with few exceptions (partic-
ularly chemical and pharmaceutical industries) ﬁrms have not used patents as the
primary strategy to secure the returns of their R&D investments (Levin et al. 1987;
Cohen et al. 2000, 2002). Still, during the last thirty years, all three powers of the
U.S. government have strengthened patent protection (Scherer 2009) and even
coerced U.S. trade partners to enforce IP law (Haskins 1998). It may seem that these
changes to patent policy were driven more by a doctrinaire view of patents than the
actual needs of industry.
Regarding the university in the Bayh-Dole regime, the change is visible in the
attitudes of university administrators towards generating revenue from licensing
intellectual property. While university patenting was increasing before 1980, the
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interest, and the public interest was thought best served by promoting wide diffusion
of inventions through affordable non-exclusive licenses—this was precisely the case
of the famous Cohen-Boyer patents. Today, university administrators are much
more interested in supporting regional (or national) economic growth than in
promoting the diffusion of inventions. Because they understand that growth is
driven by industrial innovation and entrepreneurship, they feel the public interest is
best served when universities contribute to the creation of new companies. They
also know that the ultimate measure of entrepreneurial success is the ﬁrm’s market
capitalization (its market value in ﬁnancial markets). In the case of high-tech start-
ups, market capitalization depends on intangible assets, and more speciﬁcally, on
whether the ﬁrm has exclusive rights to key patents. For this reason, university
ofﬁces of technology transfer have fewer qualms about licensing on exclusive basis
than they did thirty years ago; the public interest still guides their actions, only now
the public interest is conﬂated with the university’s ﬁnancial need and the ﬁnancial
value of the ﬁrms taking licenses. Again, this change in the way university
administrators construe the public interest seems guided by a doctrinaire view that
privileges economic growth over diffusion of innovation—which is a form of
economic distribution. Let me stress that these attitudinal changes are not arbitrary;
rather, they seem to systematically favor property rights and proﬁt maximizing
behavior. This doctrinaire character of the changes is part and parcel of a larger
political project called ‘‘neoliberalism.’’ To understand the drift in the Bayh-Dole
debate, it is thus necessary to account for the inﬂuence of neoliberal ideas on
innovation and the patent system.
Let me start by giving some context to the emergence of neoliberal ideas in the
U.S. By the time Bayh-Dole was enacted, in 1980, the thin political consensus on
the welfare state was wearing thinner in the U.S. The electoral contest of that year
brought a direct attack on big government and the institutions that represented,
particularly in economic and social policy, the growth of governmental power. The
economic debacle of the 1970s was the perfect excuse to declare the failure of any
and all government intervention in the economy, including regulatory and
redistributive policies. The discourse went beyond simply an electoral platform
for it drew from the neoliberal project, a philosophical and political project that by
that time had been in the making for nearly four decades. Neoliberalism has been
given content by various schools on both sides of the Atlantic and across various
disciplines—notably in economics, political philosophy, and law—and it is perhaps
best understood as a thought collective rather than single coherent ideology
(Mirowski 2009; cf. Harvey 2007; Turner 2008). The greatest afﬁnity among its
adherents is their shared desire to propose a practical alternative to the dominant
Western traditions of social order: ‘‘laissez-faire classical liberalism, social welfare
liberalism, and socialism’’ (Mirowski 2009, p. 431). The variety of intellectual
programs and signiﬁcant personalities (and egos) that conformed the neoliberal
thought collective never allowed to enunciate a manifesto or even a statement of
founding principles; however, most members share a fundamental belief in
unfettered markets, private property, and a minimal but strong state; strong because
it must be able to adjudicate property disputes between powerful interests (Plehwe
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monopolies are antithetical to free markets on the grounds that the prospect of
monopolistic proﬁts creates the incentive for ﬁrms to invest in R&D; monopolies
are thus necessary for innovation.
Although the word neoliberalism is not of common use in the U.S.,
2 the most
important economic, trade, and regulatory policies introduced by every Adminis-
tration since Reagan are canonical examples of neoliberal policy-making (Meeropol
1998; Pollin 2003; Van Horn and Mirowski 2009), for instance, deregulation (and
later re-regulation), devolution, the 1995 welfare reform, and NAFTA. In the speciﬁc
case of innovation policy, Slaughter and Rhoades (1996) observed the formation of a
political coalition that successfully advanced a neoliberal agenda under the banner of
promoting ‘‘competitiveness.’’ The previous political force of innovation policy, the
Cold War coalition, underlined the transformative character of basic research as the
source of U.S. leadership over the Soviet Union. They believed that the autonomy of
science was a necessary condition to unleash the creative forces of basic research and
gradually expanded funding for the scientiﬁc establishment. The new coalition was
formed in response to the emergence of Japan as an economic power and the seeming
loss of competitiveness of the U.S. economy. They attributed the economic success
of Japan to strong research in engineering and applied programs as well as the
adoption of more efﬁcient models of production and commercialization. Conse-
quently, they sought to redirect government resources to support industrial R&D and
business interests. Slaughter and Rhoades (1996) are careful not to draw easy
distinctions between these coalitions as they recognize that the emergence of the
competitiveness coalition did not fully displace the Cold War coalition. However,
these authors stress the increasing power of the new coalition in enacting key
legislation such as the Bayh-Dole Act itself and its later amendments (see Section
Changes in the Design of Bayh-Dole), the creation of the Court of Appeals of the
Federal Circuit (P.L. 98-462), the subsidies to private sector R&D through the Small
Business Innovation Development Act (P.L. 97-219), the tax-credits for clinical trials
of the Orphan Drug Act (P.L. 97-414), and dispensations on anti-trust law, including
a seven year market exclusivity for developers of ‘‘orphan drugs’’ and an exempt
status for R&D joint ventures under the National Cooperative Research Act (P.L.
98-462). Admittedly, a policy agenda for stronger patent protection, subsidies and
tax-credits for industrial R&D, and softer anti-trust legislation, looks distinctly
neoliberal.
3
The encroachment of neoliberal values in the organization of innovation
extended beyond the competitiveness coalition; in fact, it reached the very regime of
knowledge production including researchers themselves (Nedeva and Boden 2006;
Pestre 2003, 2005). The transition to the new mode of knowledge production, or
2 Neoliberalism, in U.S. political parlance, is more closely aligned with conservatism than it is to
liberalism. This is due to the curious reversal of meanings that dates back to President Roosevelt
campaigning for the New Deal reforms and describing them as truly liberal reforms. He did this with such
success that his political opponents eventually surrendered the word and adopted the label conservative
for themselves (see Lowi 1995, p. 87).
3 Compare with Bruno (2009) who discusses ‘‘competitiveness’’ in the context of the European
governance of innovation.
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(Gibbons et al. 1994; Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001). This is not the
application of theoretical or experimental knowledge typical of Mode 1, but the
context of application ‘‘describes the total environment in which scientiﬁc problems
arise, methodologies are developed, outcomes are disseminated, and uses are
deﬁned’’ (Nowotny et al. 2003, p. 186). In a Mode 2 research environment the
researcher has professional incentives to produce use-inspired research, and these
will be reinforced by the ﬁnancial incentives attached to those ‘‘useful’’ research
ﬁndings. To the extend that Mode 2 has not replaced Mode 1, the Bayh-Dole regime
is a catalyst of the transition to Mode 2. Consequently, it could be expected a
‘‘normalization’’ of the research culture stylized by the Mode 2 description,
including a legitimation of proﬁt-seeking behavior in university patenting.
The drift in the Bayh-Dole debate is thus only a reﬂection of neoliberal ideas
taking hold of policy-making in the U.S. At the legislative level, the competitive-
ness coalition reformed R&D and patent law. At the university administration level
it became more acceptable to engage in patenting and maximizing licensing income.
Even at the level of academic research, the uptake of the market values of the Bayh-
Dole regime was reinforced by the emergence of ﬁelds like information
technologies and molecular biology. The changing values at all these levels
required a new lexicon to be communicated, and as Slaughter and Rhoades (1996)
suggest, the primary rhetorical trope has been ‘‘competitiveness.’’ For this reason, I
now turn my attention to this term.
Competitiveness entered elite discourse with force about the same time Bayh-
Dole was passed.
4 The three foremost voices of elite discourse—political leaders,
journalists, and scholars—quickly took up the term. Politicians adopted compet-
itiveness because it transcends party-ideology given that the term ﬁts well with what
McCloskey and Zaller (1984) call ‘‘the American ethos’’: the bipartisan agreement
on public values such as personal freedom, self-help, and merit-based organization.
In turn, mass communication media is in constant search for words that convey
meaning, at once, intuitively and forcefully. Using LexisNexis Academic to track
wires of the Associate Press and the print edition of the New York Times, I found
that the term was used in the postwar period until 1980 a total of 117 and 201 times
respectively; the use exploded in the 1980s to 3,442 and 2,373, stabilized in the
1990s with 3,432 and 2,817, and is likely to remain at that level during the last
decade, with the count at 3,401 and 1,448 on July 2009. No less important for the
pervasiveness of competitiveness was the host of academic new ideas—in economic
theory, public management, corporate culture, and industrial policy—where the
term came to symbolize new paradigms. For instance, the efforts to conceptualize
competitiveness in economics led to revisions in the theory of ‘‘comparative
advantage’’ (for instance, Fagerberg 1988) ‘‘conditional convergence’’ (for a
theoretical and empirical synthesis, see Baumol, Nelson, and Wolff 1994). In public
administration, competitiveness was central to the emergence of the ‘‘new public
4 I use elite discourse in its standard deﬁnition in political science. That is ‘‘stereotypes, frames of
reference, and elite leadership cues that enable citizens to form conceptions of and, more importantly,
opinions about events that are beyond their full personal understanding’’ (Zaller 1992, p. 14).
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and Peters 2004). Corporate culture and industrial policy were inﬂuenced by the
notion of ‘‘competitive advantage’’ pioneered by Porter (1980, 1990).
More than any speciﬁc meaning or deﬁnition, the pervasiveness of the term in
elite discourse impressed on the public imagination the notion that competitiveness
is a public value of consensus, similar in its unqualiﬁed virtue to justice or freedom.
At that point, a whole array of social problems could begin to be articulated in terms
of their deleterious effects on competitiveness: A deﬁcient educational system
creates less competitive workers; poor public health reduces the productivity of the
labor force; higher taxes and welfare beneﬁts undermine the incentives for getting
ahead in life; government intervention creates frictions in otherwise competitive
markets. Competitiveness became, in the words of Paul Krugman (1994), an
obsession that bore the serious risk of lowering the quality of policy discussion: ‘‘If
top government ofﬁcials are committed to a particular economic doctrine, inevitably
that sets the tone for policy-making on all issues, even those which may seem to
have nothing to do with that doctrine’’ (p. 42).
Competitiveness became an all-purpose goal (if not an obsession) in policy
discussions and it was elevated to be a public value of consensus in the public
imagination. Unsurprisingly, Bayh-Dole and its subsequent amendments have been
justiﬁed in terms of promoting competitiveness; Senator Bayh himself offered this
reasoning during the hearings in 1980:
One of the greatest threats to our economic (and ultimately political) well-
being is the recent slump in American innovation and productivity…
American industry is simply not keeping up with its international competition
in too many ﬁelds. While Government patent policy is by no means the only
cause of this problem, it is certainly a contributing factor (U.S. Senate 1980).
The popularity of competitiveness, however, does not logically link patent policy
and this value. There was indeed a more formal explanation that linked patent rights
to competitiveness. First, economists deﬁne competitiveness in terms of national
productivity—measured usually as national product per hour of labor. More
precisely, competitiveness is the relative position of an economy in terms of
productivity (Hatsopoulos, Krugman, and Summers 1988; see also Klein 1988).
Second, economic theory since the 1960s has re-invigorated the old notion that
innovation is the driver of long-term productivity gains, and consequently, of
sustained economic growth. While the ﬂuctuations of the business cycle are
explained by the ﬂuctuations in employment of the factors of production, in the long
run, the size of the economy is capped by its productive capacity at full
employment. Hence, only technological innovation can expand the frontier of
production possibilities by making labor, capital, and land increasingly more
productive. Third, the other old notion that patents introduce an incentive for
innovation is also alive and well—although it had suffered some setbacks from the
Progressive Era through the 1960s as policy-makers and the courts had favored, in
some instances, anti-trust arguments over industrial patent rights. Fourth, and in
relation to the previous point, it was believed that patent rights to public research
(i.e. federally-funded research) were not clearly assigned because, unless prior
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ment retained rights to those patents. I will elaborate on the latter point further in the
next section, but here it is sufﬁcient to stress that it was thought necessary to clearly
assign patent rights to public research for the private sector to invest in the
development and commercialization of that research. This linear causal relation—
from public support of research, to assignation of patents for private exploitation, to
innovation, to productivity gains, to national competitiveness—linked Bayh-Dole to
competitiveness and made of it a national cause.
I have argued thus far that the ascendancy of neoliberal ideas over policy-making
and particularly over the innovation system were the primary source of drift in the
Bayh-Dole debate, and that competitiveness is a good point of reference to identify
neoliberal justiﬁcations of the Act and posterior reforms to its design. It is to that
aspect that I now turn my attention, the drift in the design of Bayh-Dole.
Changes in the Design of Bayh-Dole
Bayh-Dole is today a very different policy than it was when enacted. To understand
the drift in its design it is appropriate to revisit the political compromise that was
inscribed in the ﬁrst text of the Act and the subsequent amendments to it. The issue
at stake in Bayh-Dole—the right to ownership of patents originated from
government-funded research—dates back to the postwar debate on the institutional
structure of U.S. science policy. Two prominent ﬁgures in that debate, Vannevar
Bush, former director of the wartime Ofﬁce of Scientiﬁc R&D, and Senator Harley
Kilgore, are representative of the opposing views on the issue of patents. Bush
recognized the inventors’ rights to their inventions; Kilgore, in turn, contended that
the public interest was best served when the government retained ownership
(Guston 2000; Sampat 2006).
For little more than three decades, the issue of a government-wide policy was
revisited only twice. First, President Kennedy’s memorandum of 1963 (36 F.R.
16889) explicitly asserted the government rights to public-funded inventions but
granted certain latitude to federal agencies to transfer title to contractors or license
government patents on exclusive basis under special circumstances and on
reasonable terms. Then, President Nixon’s memorandum and policy statement of
1971 (28 F.R. 90343) reafﬁrmed the administrative discretion granted by his
predecessor but denied that a ‘‘single presumption of ownership of patent rights to
Government-sponsored inventions’’ was a ‘‘satisfactory basis’’ for government-wide
patent policy.
5 What these memoranda reﬂect is a de ´tente between parties in the
Bush-Kilgore discord. Still, the conventional moral wisdom that public-funded
research should lead to patents held in the public domain prevailed, not without
permitting extraordinary and reasonable exceptions. This ambivalence of principle
5 See Woolley and Peters (2009b) for Presidential Memorandum of 1971 and see the Federal Register for
the Policy Statement of August 26, 1971 (36 F.R. 16889) and the Policy Statement of October 11, 1963
(28 F.R. 90343).
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different patent policies in force by the end of the 1970s (Eisenberg 1996, p. 1694).
Bayh-Dole ended the policy ambivalence and achieved uniformity in patent
policy across most federal agencies
6 but it did not end the Bush-Kilgore discord. By
the late 1970s, many lawmakers—particularly those who fought the legislative
battles for expanding the welfare state in the 1960s—would have scoffed at the idea
of transferring government patent rights directly to industrial interests. The enacting
coalition of Bayh-Dole had to overcome serious objections and in doing so it
equipped it with provisions to balance the various intervening interests.
7
The objections were mainly three. If the Act was enacted, it was feared that
granting rights on proﬁtable patents would be seen as a government giveaway to
large industrial interests, that unrestricted exclusive licenses would promote non-
competitive practices such as excessive pricing and the stiﬂing of potential
competitors, and that taxpayers would be denied their fair share of returns on
research investments that yielded proﬁtable patents.
The balancing mechanisms were inscribed in the proposed bill (S. 414,
introduced on February 9, 1979) and they were successful preempting the
aforementioned objections. To neutralize accusations that this policy was a
giveaway to corporations, the Act explicitly states its aim ‘‘to encourage maximum
participation of small business ﬁrms in federally supported research’’ (35 U.S.C.
§200), requires that small businesses be given preference when granting a license
(35 U.S.C. §202-c-7-D) and, when enacted in 1980, it limited the time length of
exclusive licenses for large businesses to ﬁve years. To forestall allegations that the
taxpayer’s investments in research would never yield monetary return, the text of
the Act—as originally introduced to the Senate—included a provision for the
government to recoup a portion of the licensing income. Finally, and as the
cornerstone of all safeguards against the lack-of-use, misuse, or abuse of titles or
licenses, the Act established two mechanisms for government intervention before
and after rights to title are granted. The ﬁrst of these mechanisms allows funding
agencies to limit or cancel the rights to an invention ‘‘in exceptional circumstances
when it is determined by the agency that restriction or elimination of the right to
retain title to any subject invention will better promote the policy and objectives of
the Act’’ (35 U.S.C. §202-a-ii), namely, that inventions ‘‘are used in a manner to
promote free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future
research and discovery’’ (35 U.S.C. §200). The second provision has two elements.
First, it requires contractors that take title to inventions to grant, in favor of the
funding agency, a ‘‘nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license’’ (35
U.S.C. §202-c-4). Second, it confers the respective federal agency ‘‘march-in
rights.’’ These rights are legal authority for the agency to practice such a royalty-
free license under certain circumstances, primarily when ‘‘the contractor or assignee
has not taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable time, effective steps to
6 Bayh-Dole exempts research programs directly tied to national security, especially at the Department of
Defense.
7 See Stevens (2004) and Washburn (2005, Chap. 5) for accounts of the closed-door negotiations leading
to the legislative agreement on Bayh-Dole.
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safety needs which are not reasonably satisﬁed by the contractor, assignee, or their
licensees’’ (35 U.S.C. §203).
It would not be an exaggeration to say that, in 1980, not even the few skeptics of
Bayh-Dole could imagine how weak and impractical were those safeguard
provisions. The ﬁrst blow to the safeguards was inﬂicted even before the bill was
passed: the ﬁnal text of the Act did not include the recoupment provision. The
second strike to the safeguards came with President Reagan’s memorandum of 1983
that eased the restrictions for large companies to beneﬁt from Bayh-Dole (see
Woolley and Peters 2009a, for Memorandum on Government Patent Policy of
February 18, 1983). Congress later amended the Act according to this memoran-
dum, further striking down the ﬁve-year limitation on exclusive licensing for large
companies in Trademark Clariﬁcation Act of 1984 (PL 98-620). Furthermore, the
provision for agency intervention was by design impractical given that its
application requires meeting the high threshold of ‘‘exceptional circumstances.’’
In fact, the sole place where this provision has been used is a solicitation for
molecular target laboratories by the National Cancer Institute (2000).
Likewise, regarding the march-in rights provision, Admiral Hyman Rickover,
famous for directing the development of the nuclear submarine, warned during the
hearings that it was impractical for the government to supervise the development of
technology sufﬁciently to justify the use of march-in rights. The admiral thought of it
as simply a cosmetic provision crafted to placate objectors to the Act. In time, his
fears proved warranted. As this provision was regulated (37 CFR 401.6), agencies
considered exercising the rights only upon petition of a disaffected third party, and
under the Trademark Clariﬁcation Act of 1984, any march-in determination is held in
abeyance until the appeal process is exhausted (P.L. 98-620; §V-9). It is thus not
surprising that only three petitions have been presented, and all were found
unjustiﬁed by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) (see details in the next section).
Asserting that the changes to the terms of the Bayh-Dole debate and the changes
to its design reﬂect the ascendancy of neoliberal ideas in US policy making, is not
sufﬁcient to evaluate these changes. If we think that the value of the technology
transfer regime resides in its ability to streamline commercialization of public
research, the current terms of the debate would not be a concern at all. If instead we
see technology transfer policy as serving various public values other than those
related to commercialization, we should assess how well the Act is performing with
respect to those values. To this end, the next section will introduce the evaluation
approach called ‘‘public value failure’’ and deploy it on Bayh-Dole.
Public Value Failure in the Bayh-Dole Regime
The most inﬂuential rationale for policy evaluation is known as Market Failure
Criteria. This is a normative theory for public action that justiﬁes government
intervention in the economy when markets fail to behave as perfectly competitive
markets (Bator 1958; Samuelson 1954). The notion of perfect competition is an ideal
state of frictionless markets where consumers and producers transact with complete
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goods transacted. The fundamental assumption of market failure is that perfectly
competitive markets allocate resources efﬁciently in a Pareto optimal sense, that is,
no person can be made better off without making another worse off.
This speciﬁc deﬁnition of efﬁciency, that means all markets clear at current
prices, is silent about the pattern of distribution of resources. This point can be
sufﬁciently illustrated by a stylized economy of two individuals who must divide a
loaf of bread. An efﬁcient allocation, in the Pareto optimal sense, is any allocation
that exhausts the loaf; for instance, each person gets half, or one person gets the
entire loaf while the other gets nothing. Perfect competition guarantees an efﬁcient
allocation in this speciﬁc sense (no bread is wasted), but it should be noted, too, that
perfect competition supports any allocation of resources, however intolerable or
unjust such an allocation is.
Notwithstanding this inadequacy dealing with issues of distribution, market
failure became enormously inﬂuential in policy analysis and policy-making circles
in the U.S. partly because it was vested with all the scientiﬁc authority that
economic theory could muster—general equilibrium theory—and partly because it
provided the Cold War generation with a rationale for government intervention that
did not betray their commitment to the market system, quite the contrary: it
celebrated markets. Such is the sway of market failure, that its method par
excellence, cost-beneﬁt analysis, was instituted as the norm when assessing
prospectively federal regulatory initiatives—following President Reagan’s E.O.
12291 of 1981 and President Clinton’s E.O. 12866 of 1994.
8
In spite of its popularity, market failure has a fundamental problem because social
groupsdonotalwaysvalueefﬁciencyorthefreedomofmarketasasuperordinategoal.
Rather, societies often balance the free markets against other values like security or
justice, and as a consequence, governments may be fully justiﬁed to take action even
whenmarketsdonotfail.Considerthecaseofbasicnecessitiessuchashousing,food,
or medicine. At any price level—even at the marginal cost of production, that is, the
price of perfect competition—there will be a segment of the population unable to
afford thoseprices. Ifsocialvalueswere suchthatthe provision ofbasicnecessitiesto
all citizens overrides the value of free markets; then, the government would have
reasons to secure the provision of those goods for the entire population.
To escape this fundamental narrowness of market failure, Bozeman (2002)
proposed an alternative rationale, called Public Value Failure Criteria, that expands
the analysis to non-market values. Whereas market failure prescribes public action
only to restore perfect competition, public value failure prescribes action when any
of several discrete ‘‘core public values’’ go underserved or neglected. This begs the
question of which public values exactly? In answering this question Bozeman
produced a canonical set of public values that reﬂects well-established convictions
about the rule of law and democratic policy-making (e.g. transparency, inclusive-
ness) but that are also distilled from a pragmatic theory of the public interest in
8 It should be noted that President Reagan’s executive order introduced cost-beneﬁt analysis as part of the
Regulatory Impact Analysis. The RIA also mandates the assessment of distributive and fairness impacts,
although these are not formalized in a method in the same way as cost-beneﬁt analysis.
The Stakes in Bayh-Dole 37
123democracy in the tradition of Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems (Dewey 1927;
the theory in Bozeman 2007: Chap. 5). This canonical set of public values is referred
to as ‘‘public value failure criteria’’ (Bozeman 2002) or as ‘‘public value mapping
criteria’’ (PVM-C) when embedded in the public value mapping method (see
Bozeman and Sarewitz, this issue).
Note that assessing policy with the public value failure criteria is a ‘‘negative
test,’’ in the sense that it helps to identify failures to serve the public interest rather
than to positively afﬁrm whether a given policy is in fact furthering the common
good. Bozeman formulated his criteria—the core set of public values—in such a
way that it symmetrically counterposes the market failure criteria. Taking this
symmetry in consideration, I have adapted Bozeman’s criteria for the particular
purpose of evaluating Bayh-Dole.
Table 1 summarizes Bozeman’s public value failure criteria (ﬁrst column),
transposes it to the Bayh-Dole problem (second column), and summarizes the main
public value failures (third column) that are described in detail next.
Equal Voice and Equal Consideration
A failure of aggregation of interests, occurs, explains Bozeman (2002), when ‘‘core
public values are skirted because of ﬂaws in the policy-making processes’’ (p. 151).
These failures could be attributed to ill-designed institutions governing the policy
process, or the failures could be procedural when they are due to a willful or
heedless deviation from due process. Procedural ﬂaws could be uncovered by
process audits and are commonly attributed to negligence or corruption. Failures of
Table 1 Summary assessment of Bayh-Dole with PVM criteria
Public value failure criteria. In
parenthesis, the market failure
analog.
Equivalent criteria
for evaluation of
Bayh-Dole.
Brief description of the failure.
Interest aggregation and
articulation (general failures of
the price system).
Equal voice and equal
consideration.
Opposition to Bayh-Dole was neutralized by
ill-designed safeguards that were easily
defused and struck down.
Legitimate monopolies
(monopolies and non-
competitive market structures).
Legal attributions of
government.
Failure to enforce march-in rights for
controlling excesses of monopolistic
pricing.
Failure to support universities balancing
organizational needs and the public interest.
Imperfect public information
(asymmetric information).
Transparency. No formal channels for holding
implementation agents (OTTs)
accountable.
Distribution of beneﬁts (beneﬁt
hoarding and rent-seeking).
Preclusion of beneﬁt
hoarding.
Lack of institutional mechanisms to
determine ‘‘imperatives’’ for exclusive
licensing.
Provider availability
(monopsonies and non-
competitive chains of supply).
Provision of public
goods and services.
Exclusion of ﬁrms willing to develop
applications in a competitive environment.
38 W. D. Valdivia
123design are harder to detect because the system may work by-the-book. Bozeman
(2002, 2007) offers an example of structural problems facilitated by the seemingly
reasonable rule of seniority for the chairmanship of Congressional committees; the
problem was that this rule enabled tenured Southern congressmen to impede Civil
Rights reforms for decades until the mid 1960s. Likewise, analyzing U.S. science
policy, Bozeman and Sarewitz (2005) characterize another structural ﬂaw, arguing
that the science policy system of the U.S. does not have a mechanism to involve lay
citizens in crucial policy decisions such as the portfolio allocation of federal
research funds. In both cases, policy-making institutions work according to design
and still widely held public values (such as equal rights or social returns on public
investments) fail to be articulated and the resulting policy aggregates the competing
values unduly privileging some stakeholders over others.
The swift passage of Bayh-Dole suggests bipartisan cooperation, a success of
aggregation of interests. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the sponsors of
the Act had anticipated opposition and crafted provisions to address each major
objection. This tactic effectively neutralized opposition.
The degree to which the policy drifted from the seeming compromise of its ﬁrst
statutory version may not have been suspected by the sponsors of the bill, and surely,
it was not foreseen by the opposition that was placated with the safeguard provisions.
In retrospect, one is left wondering if the safeguards were mainly introduced to
deﬂect objections rather than give objections due consideration. Were the voices of
dissent given due consideration or were they simply assuaged under the pretense of
safeguard provisions and the urgency of implementing solutions to the competitive-
ness crisis? The hearings of Bayh-Dole cannot be charged for failing to give equal
voice to proponents and objectors; it is doubtful, however, that all voices have been
given equal consideration consistently since 1980 when the Act was enacted.
Legal Attributions of Government
A public value failure occurs when private individuals or institutions exercise rights
thataretheexclusiveprivilegeofgovernment,suchasspeakingonbehalfofthewhole
of society or making law and regulations to protect the public interest. For instance,
foreign policy and the prevention of a ﬂu pandemic, argue Bozeman (2002) and
Feeney andBozeman(2007)respectively, are bothresponsibilitiesandattributionsof
the government that no individual or organization can take upon itself to provide.
Likewise,BozemanandSarewitz(2005)warnofpublicvaluefailurewhenlittleorno
governmental authority is executed to protect the physical and mental integrity of
human subjects participating in clinical trials. When researchers conducting those
studieshaveaneconomicinterestinthecompaniesproducingthedrugstried,apublic
value failure ensues if the researcher’s conﬂict of interest is not fully disclosed to
participants because it cannot be assumed that subjects who consented to participate
were fully informed of the beneﬁts and risks of their participation.
Likewise, the enforcement of march-in rights in the face of excessive pricing and
other monopolistic practices is a statutory attribution of government, and the failure
to enforce has been indeed a public value failure. Three cases were brought to a
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the ﬁrst case, CellPro, Inc. had intended to license patents granted to competitor
Baxter by Johns Hopkins University (developed with NIH grants). NIH found that
Baxter was actively practicing the patent seeking FDA approval on a device with
those patents; provided that Bayh-Dole requires only reasonable effort to practice the
patent, the NIH rejected the petition (NIH 1997). The other two cases regarding drugs
Norvir, an HIV/AIDS treatment, and Xalatan, a treatment for glaucoma, merited a
similar conclusion from the NIH (see resolutions in NIH 2004a, b). In both cases, the
petitioners had complained of excessive pricing and requested the government to
exercise its royalty-free license with respect to titles held by Abbott Laboratories and
Pﬁzer respectively. However, NIH stressed that, under Bayh-Dole, the exercise of
march-in rights was limited to circumstances where the patents in question were not
practiced or to alleviate health and safety needs, neither of which applied to Norvir
and Xalatan that were already commercial products. The NIH concluded that ‘‘the
extraordinary remedy of march-in is not an appropriate means of controlling prices’’
(NIH 2004b). This interpretation is nevertheless controversial; for instance, legal
scholars Arno and Davis (2001, p. 662) ﬁnd ‘‘countless references in the legislative
record to the need to maintain competitive market conditions through the exercise of
march-in rights,’’ including the control of proﬁts and prices.
The neglect to afﬁrm march-in rights is as much a public value failure in patent
policy as it would be laxity in enforcing informed consent in the regulation of
human subject in research. The weakening of the safeguards built-in the Act partly
explains the observed government tolerance of monopolistic practices, but it does
not justify the three-decade neglect of regulatory support to universities in dealing
with the tensions of revenue-seeking licensing activities and their public service
mission. It is worthwhile to stress that government-backed institutions would greatly
assist universities in their efforts for good governance and self-regulation.
Transparency
The citizens’ ability to exercise oversight over the policy process, from design to
implementation, is often considered a public value of consensus. Bozeman (2007)
argues that lack of transparency in the policy process inhibits this ability resulting in
a public value failure. The canonical examples are closed-door executive meetings
such as the Clinton task force for health care reform (Hacker 1997) or the Cheney
talks on energy policy (Bozeman 2007); neither the First Lady nor the Vice
President transgressed due process but they both met deep skepticism from various
publics who, with good reason, interpreted the lack of transparency as a threat to the
public interest.
In contrast to these examples of public value failure, the passing of Bayh-Dole,
while swift, was indeed subject to customary hearings and debate. It may not be
easy to challenge the fact that the Act was enacted in a public and transparent
fashion. Its implementation, on the other hand, is not so obviously transparent.
Admittedly, the implementation of the core logic of the Act is straightforward: the
government confers rights of intellectual ownership to research contractors (e.g.
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them. Nevertheless, the implementation of the Act’s safeguards of the public
interests is much less transparent. Granting of rights to research contractors should
also be construed as a delegation of the government’s ﬁduciary duty to society with
respect to publicly funded innovation. At the same time, university ofﬁces of
technology transfer are constituted with the clear mission to proﬁtably commer-
cialize university inventions. Seeking to ﬁnd a market for those inventions is as
much a business as real estate or venture capital. Whether the OTT is constituted
inside the organization (as a division or department) or outside (as an independent
legal vehicle), its performance will primarily be assessed by revenue generation.
Revenue is derived from licensing patents in two modalities, cash or stock options
in the licensee ﬁrms. Hence, many of the companies licensing from the university
will be start-ups founded by faculty members working on a particular invention and
will partner with the OTT that provides them with the resources and legal expertise
to develop their high-technology products. In this partnership the OTT is constituted
across two spheres, the university and the industry. It is crucial for the ﬁrm to keep
private information secret if the ﬁrm is to successfully position itself in the
marketplace—information that includes technical aspects of the product under
development, the conﬁguration of the supply chain, and the marketing and business
strategy of the ﬁrm. The OTT is the most important partner for the ﬁrm at this early
stage and must be committed to secrecy if it is to be a valuable partner;
consequently, the OTT cannot be expected to function adequately if it is open to
public scrutiny. This is a public value failure by design: the burden of
implementation of Bayh-Dole befalls on organizations that straddle the public
and the private and therefore cannot be entirely transparent. In fact, the OTT by
design sits astride the public spheres of knowledge creation and the private spheres
of proﬁt making and is therefore ill equipped to internalize the ensuing tensions
because the delegation of Bayh-Dole is much more clear about implementing the
proﬁt incentive than it is delegating the government’s ﬁduciary duty.
Preclusion of Beneﬁt Hoarding
The best example of this public value failure concerns precisely technology transfer
policy. Bozeman and Sarewitz (2005) explain how the Federal Technology Transfer
Act of 1986 (15 U.S.C. §3701–3714), that instituted cooperative agreements
(CRADAs) between federal laboratories and industry, resulted in one visible case in
the commercialization of a technology design to hoard the beneﬁts of improved
varieties of seeds. Seed-sterilizing technology, also called the terminator-gene, was
developed under a CRADA between the Department of Agriculture and Delta and
Pine Land Co., as a complex bioengineered procedure that prevents farmers from
producing second-generation seeds from ﬁrst-generation crops, thus enforcing
intellectual property rights on new varieties of seed. Small farmers, including
subsistence farmers in the developing world, explained these authors, ‘‘continually
seek better plant varieties for local growing conditions, through careful selection of
kept seed, as well as purchase of new varieties from both public and private seed
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prevents such practices and deprives vulnerable farmers from free riding the new
seed varieties. However, the purpose of government for funding research to improve
agricultural methods including the engineering of seeds for better crop varieties is to
improve stability and sufﬁciency of the food supply by means of improving the
productivity of arable land, irrigation, and crops. Seed-sterilizing technology does
not serve that purpose or the values that inspire it.
It would be a mistake to blame the CRADAs mechanism for the development of
seed-sterilizing technology. Rather, the cause for this public value failure is the lack
of institutional safeguards of the public interest that upon discovery of the
terminator-gene did not prevent a ﬁrm from obtaining rights to the patents of such a
technology. This lesson resonates with the implementation of Bayh-Dole because
the problem in this case is not the proﬁt incentive but the assumption that
monopolistic proﬁts are the only level of incentive that will bring about the
development and commercialization of research. Exclusive licensing is hardly
warranted when fundamental discoveries or research tools are in question or when
the application is nearly contained in the patent. In the former, the collective efforts
of a research community could be throttled; in the latter, a competitive environment
would better serve the wide dissemination of the technology. Thus, unless there is
only one company willing to develop an application with a public-research patent,
exclusive licensing of such a patent is a form of beneﬁt hoarding.
Provision of Public Goods and Services
Even when private initiative is motivated by public values, as is the case of charity,
the entrepreneur may decide the time, quality, and form of the service, and may
even decide to discontinue its provision, at his discretion. When the government
provides a service motivated by public values, any changes in the service level and
quality should a priori reﬂect a change of values or a shift in the way public values
organize public priorities. However, when the government delegates to a contractor
the provision of a given service, private discretion over the provision may not
represent a change in public values as much as it will be a change in the
determinants of the bottom-line of the contractor. Bozeman (2007) declares that a
public value failure will occur in a situation where the government, having
delegated a given service in the past, ﬁnds itself in a situation where the need
emerges to provide that service with urgency, yet neither it can avail itself of
contractors nor it has the capacity to provide the needed service anymore.
As was discussed earlier, Bayh-Dole solved a two-sided problem by simulta-
neously providing an incentive for demand and supply of R&D by motivating a
greater concern for mission-oriented research and by granting legal protection to
developmental investors respectively. In this sense, Bayh-Dole provides two public
goods of great value: more socially sensitive research and lesser risk for technology
developers. Was there a shortage of these services before the Act? Research is not
conclusive on this respect but one thing is certain: the abrupt increase of transferring
activity since 1980 must have reduced any shortage or even perhaps turned it into a
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research tools are licensed exclusively, Bayh-Dole is reducing the availability of
technological applications that would exist if those tools would be licensed on a
non-exclusive basis (Mazzeloni and Nelson 1998; Colyvas et al. 2002). Likewise,
the cases where there is at least one company willing to take a non-exclusive license
and develop a technology in a competitive environment (typical of some industries
such as software and mobile telephony), an exclusive license is actually curtailing
other ﬁrms from providing new products at competitive prices. In the absence of
institutional mechanisms that restrain monopolistic excesses, the Act has two edges,
one that expands the demand and supply of economically valuable R&D and
another that cuts the number of potential providers. Again, appropriate institutional
mechanisms could keep the incentives of the Act in place and, at the same time,
maximize the number of research programs and developers willing to compete with
each other in a race that promotes the public interest.
Conclusion
The direction of the Bayh-Dole debate was inﬂuenced by the new political and
economic context in which it unfolded. Neoliberal conceptions of the economy,
innovation, and property rights came to dominate the political discourse since the
1980s and the Bayh-Dole debate became dominated by the banners of the
imperative of innovation and especially ‘‘competitiveness.’’ This situation and
the attrition of countervailing forces in the enacting coalition allowed for a
legislative drift of the Act and a rollback of safeguards introduced to protect
economic opportunity and access, increasing in this way the authority of markets.
In terms of public value failures, it could be said that with the passing of time,
voice and consideration is less and less equal in the Bayh-Dole debate, that the
legitimate attributions of government are in retreat, and that the ambiguity of the
delegation of the ﬁduciary role is condoning an environment of business secrecy.
The enthusiasm for a hands-off government has resulted in a vacuum of institutional
safeguards of economic opportunity; a vacuum manifested in the NIH inability to
exercise march-in rights due to its narrow interpretation of that provision, and
manifested, too, in the lack of government support for universities that were left to
their own resources to countervail the force of ﬁnancial need with the more tenuous
commitment to public service.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Arno, Peter S., and Michael H. Davis. 2001. Why don’t we enforce existing drug price controls?: The
unrecognized and unenforced reasonable pricing requirements imposed upon patents deriving in
whole or in part from federally funded research. Tulane Law Review 75: 632–693.
The Stakes in Bayh-Dole 43
123Baumol, William J., Richard R. Nelson, and Edward N. Wolff. 1994. Convergence of productivity: Cross-
national studies and historical evidence. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bayh, Birch, Joseph Allen, and Howard W. Bremer. 2009. Universities, inventors and the Bayh-Dole Act.
Life Sciences Law and Industry Report 24(3): 1–5.
Bator, Francis M. 1958. The anatomy of market failure. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 72(3):
351–379.
Bozeman, Barry. 2002. Public value failure: When efﬁcient markets may not do. Public Administration
Review 62(2): 134–151.
Bozeman, Barry. 2007. Public Values and the Public Interest. Washington: Georgetown University Press.
Bozeman, Barry, and Daniel Sarewitz. 2005. Public values and public failure in U.S. science policy.
Science and Public Policy 32(2): 119–136.
Bruno, Isabelle. 2009. The ‘‘indeﬁnite discipline’’ of competitiveness benchmarking as a neoliberal
technology of government. Minerva 47(3): 261–280.
Cohen, Wesley M., Richard R. Nelson, and John P. Walsh. 2000. Protecting their intellectual assets:
Appropriability conditions and why U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms patent (or not). NBER working papers,
no. 7552. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cohen, Wesley M., Richard R. Nelson, and John P. Walsh. 2002. Links and impacts: The inﬂuence of
public research on industrial R&D. Management Science 48(1): 1–23.
Colyvas, Jeannette, Michael Crow, Annetine Gelijns, Roberto Mazzoleni, Richard R. Nelson, Nathan
Rosenberg, and Bhaven N. Sampat. 2002. How do university inventions get into practice?
Management Science 48(1): 61–72.
Dewey, John. 1927. The public and its problems. New York: Henry Holt.
Eisenberg, Rebecca S. 1996. Public research and private development: patents and technology transfer in
government- sponsored research. Virginia Law Review 82(8): 1663–1727.
Gibbons, Michael, Camille Limoges, Simon Schwartzman, Helga Nowotny, Martin Trow, and Peter
Scott. 1994. The new production of knowledge: The dynamics of science and research in
contemporary societies. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Greenberg, Daniel S. 2007. Science for sale: The perils, rewards and delusions of campus capitalism.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Fagerberg, Jan. 1988. International competitiveness. Economic Journal 98(391): 355–374.
Feeney, Mary K., and Barry Bozeman. 2007. Public values and public failure: Implications of the
2004–2005 ﬂu vaccine case. Public Integrity 9(2): 175–190.
Guston, David H. 2000. Between politics and science: Assuring the integrity and productivity of research.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacker, Jacob S. 1997. The road to nowhere: The genesis of President Clinton’s plan for health security.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Harvard Business Review. 2010. The HBR list: Breakthrough ideas for 2010. Harvard Business Review
(Jan–Feb).
Harvey, David. 2007. A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Haskins, Keshia B. 1998. Special 301 in China and Mexico: A policy which fails to consider how politics,
economics, and culture affect legal change under Civil Law systems of developing countries.
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 9: 1125–1170.
Hatsopoulos, George N., Paul R. Krugman, and Lawrence H. Summers. 1988. US competitiveness:
Beyond the trade deﬁcit. Science 241(4863): 299–307.
Heller, Michael A. 1998. The tragedy of the anticommons: Property in the transition from Marx to
markets. Harvard Law Review 111(3): 621–688.
Heller, Michael A., and Rebecca S. Eisenberg. 1998. Can patents deter innovation? The anticommons in
biomedical research. Science 280(5364): 698–701.
Henderson, Rebecca, Adam B. Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg. 1998. Universities as a source of
commercial technology: A detailed analysis of university patenting 1965–1988. The Review of
Economic Statistics 80: 119–127.
Hood, Christopher. 1991. A public management for all seasons? Public Administration 69: 3–119.
Hood, Christopher, and Guy Peters. 2004. The middle aging of new public management: Into the age of
paradox. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 14(3): 267–282.
Horn, Murray J., and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1989. Commentary on ‘‘Administrative arrangements and the
political control of agencies’’: Administrative process and organizational form as legislative
responses to agency costs. Virginia Law Review 75(2): 499–508.
44 W. D. Valdivia
123Jaffe, Adam, and Josh Lerner. 2004. Innovation and its discontents: How our broken patent system is
endangering innovation and progress and what to do about it. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Jensen, Richard, and Marie Thursby. 2001. Proofs and prototypes for sale: The licensing of university
inventions. The American Economic Review 91(1): 240–259.
Judson, Horace F. 2004. The great betrayal: Fraud in science. Orlando: Harcourt.
Kenney, Martin, and Donald Patton. 2009. Reconsidering the Bayh-Dole Act and the current university
invention ownership model. Research Policy 38: 1407–1422.
Klein, Lawrence R. 1988. Components of competitiveness. Science 241(4863): 308–313.
Krugman, Paul. 1994. Competitiveness: A dangerous obsession. Foreign Affairs 72(2): 28–44.
Levin, Richard C., Alvin K. Kevorick, Richard R. Nelson, and Sidney G. Winter. 1987. Appropriating the
returns from industrial research and development. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 3:
783–820.
Litan, Robert E., Lesa Mitchell, and E. J. Reedy. 2007. The university as innovator: Bumps in the road.
Issues in Science and Technology. http://www.issues.org/23.4/litan.html. Accessed 15 May 2009.
Lowi, Theodore J. 1995. The end of the Republican era. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Mazzeloni, Roberto, and Richard R. Nelson. 1998. The beneﬁts and costs of strong patent protection: A
contribution to the current debate. Research Policy 27(3): 273–284.
McCloskey, Herbert, and John Zaller. 1984. The American ethos: Public attitudes toward capitalism and
democracy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Meeropol, M. 1998. Surrender: How the Clinton administration completed the Reagan revolution. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Merges, Robert P., and Richard R. Nelson. 1990. On the complex economics of patent scope. Columbia
Law Review 90: 839–916.
McCubbins, Matthew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. Administrative procedures as
instruments of political control. Journal of Law Economics and Organization 3(2): 243–277.
Mirowski, Philip, and Esther-Mirjam Sent. 2007. The commercialization of science and the response of
STS. In The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, 3rd ed, eds. Edward J. Hackett, Olga
Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch, and Judy Wajcman, 635–690. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Mirowski, Philip. 2009. Postface: Deﬁning neoliberalism. In The road from Mont Pe `lerin: The making of
the neoliberal thought collective, eds. Philip Mirowski, and Dieter Plehwe, 417–455. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Mowery, David C., Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat, and Arvids A. Ziedonis. 2004. Ivory tower
and industrial innovation: University-industry technology before and after the Bayh-Dole Act in the
United States. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Mowery, David C., and Arvids A. Ziedonis. 2002. Academic patent quality and quantity before and after
the Bayh–Dole Act in the United States. Research Policy 31: 399–418.
National Cancer Institute. 2000. Solicitation, molecular target laboratories. Commerce Business Daily,
published in CBDNet on February 18, 2000.
National Institutes of Health. 1997. Determination in the case of petition of Cellpro, Inc. August.
http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug97/nihb-01.htm. Accessed 12 June 2009.
National Institutes of Health. 2004a. Determination in the case of Norvir manufactured by Abbott
Laboratories, Inc. July 2. http://ott.od.nih.gov/policy/March-In-Norvir.pdf. Accessed 12 June 2009.
National Institutes of Health. 2004b. Determination in the case of Xalatan manufactured by Pﬁzer, Inc.
September 1. http://ott.od.nih.gov/policy/March-in-xalatan.pdf. Accessed 12 June 2009.
National Research Council. 2010. Managing University intellectual property in the public interest.
Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
Nedeva, Maria, and Rebecca Boden. 2006. Changing science: The advent of neo-liberalism. Prometheus
24(3): 269–281.
Nowotny, Helga, Peter Scott, and Michael Gibbons. 2001. Re-thinking science: Knowledge and the public
in an age of uncertainty. Malden: Blackwell.
Nowotny, Helga, Peter Scott, and Michael Gibbons. 2003. Introduction. ‘Mode 2’ revisited: The new
production of knowledge. Minerva 41(3): 179–194.
Pestre, Dominique. 2003. Regimes of knowledge production in society: Towards a more political and
social reading. Minerva 41(3): 245–261.
Pestre, Dominique. 2005. The technosciences between markets, social worries and the political: How to
imagine a better future? In The public nature of science under assault: Politics, markets, science,
and the law, eds. Helga Nowotny, Dominique Pestre, Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Helmuth Schulze-
Fielitz, and Hans-Heinrich Trute, 29–52. New York: Springer.
The Stakes in Bayh-Dole 45
123Plehwe, Dieter, and Bernhard Walber. 2006. Between network and complex organization: The making of
neoliberal knowledge and hegemony. In Neoliberal hegemony: A global critique, eds. Bernhard
Walpen, Dieter Plehwe, and Gisela Nuenho ¨ffer, 27–70. London: Routledge.
Pollin, Robert. 2003. Contours of descent: U.S. economic fractures and the landscape of global austerity.
London: Verso.
Pollit, Christopher, and Geert Bouckaert. 2004. Public management reform: A comparative analysis,
2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
Porter, Michael E. 1980. Competitive strategy: Techniques for analyzing industries and competitors.
New York: The Free Press.
Porter, Michael E. 1990. The competitive advantage of nations. New York: The Free Press.
Rafferty, Matthew. 2008. The Bayh–Dole Act and university research and development. Research Policy
37: 29–40.
Sampat, Bhaven N. 2006. Universities and intellectual property: Shaping a new patent policy for
government funded academic research. In Shaping science and technology policy: The next
generation of research, eds. David H. Guston, and Daniel Sarewitz, 55–76. Madison: The University
of Wisconsin Press.
Sampat, Bhaven N., David C. Mowery, and Arvids A. Ziedonis. 2003. Changes in university patent
quality after the Bayh-Dole Act: A re-examination. International Journal of Industrial Organization
21(9): 1371–1390.
Samuelson, Paul A. 1954. The pure theory of public expenditure. The Review of Economics and Statistics
36(4): 387–389.
Scherer, F. Michael. 2009. The political economy of patent policy reform in the United States. Journal of
Telecommunications and High-Technology Law 7(2): 101–148.
Schneider, Anne L., and Helen Ingram. 1997. Policy design for democracy. Lawrence: University of
Kansas Press.
Shapiro, Carl. 2000. Navigating the patent thicket: Cross licenses, patent pools, and standard setting.
Innovation Policy and the Economy 1: 119–150.
Slaughter, Sheila, and Larry L. Leslie. 1997. Academic capitalism: Politics, policies, and the
entrepreneurial university. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Slaughter, Sheila, and Gary Rhoades. 1996. The emergence of a competitiveness research and
development policy coalition and the commercialization of academic science and technology.
Science, Technology, and Human Values 21(3): 303–339.
Slaughter, Sheila, and Gary Rhoades. 2004. Academic capitalism and the new economy: Markets, state,
and higher education. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Stevens, Ashley J. 2004. The Enactment of Bayh-Dole. Journal of Technology Transfer 29(1): 93–99.
Turner, Rachel S. 2008. Neo-liberal ideology: History, concepts and policies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.
Thursby, Jerry, and Marie Thursby. 2006. Where is the new science in corporate R&D. Science 314(8):
1547–1548.
U.S. Senate. 1980. Statement of Senator Birch Bayh to the Committee on the Judiciary and Commerce, on
government patent policy, January 25, 1980. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Ofﬁce.
Van Horn, R., and Philip Mirowski. 2009. The rise of the Chicago school of economics and the birth of
neoliberalism. In The road from Mont Pe `lerin: The making of the neoliberal thought collective, eds.
Philip Mirowski, and Dieter Plehwe, 139–178. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Walsh, John P., Ashish Arora, and Wesley M. Cohen. 2003. The patenting and licensing of research tools
and biomedical innovation. In Patents in the knowledge-based economy, eds. Wesley M. Cohen, and
Stephen A. Merrill, 285–340. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
Washburn, Jennifer. 2005. University Inc.: The corporate corruption of higher education. New York:
Basic Books.
Woolley, John T., and Gerhard Peters. 2009a. The American Presidency Project [online]. University of
California Santa Barbara. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3130. Accessed 8 Jan 2009.
Woolley, John T., and Gerhard Peters. 2009b. The American Presidency Project [online]. University of
California Santa Barbara. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40945. Accessed 8 Jan 2009.
Zaller, J.R. 1992. The nature and origins of mass opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press.
46 W. D. Valdivia
123